The paper examines historical changes in the duration of the interval between the commercial introduction of a new product and the time when entry by later competitors begins. A priori reasons are examined why the duration of this interval in the U.S. economy may either expand or contract.
Historical accounts tell us how, at the turn of the 20 th century, competing firms in the infant phonograph record industry relied heavily on secrets to protect their property rights in innovations. Engineers at the Columbia Phonograph Company worked behind locked laboratory doors. Even patenting a device was considered tantamount to advertising it. Would such a strategy be equally effective in the same industry today?
Investment in innovation is driven by expectations of transitory monopoly returns that innovations are supposed to yield. There have always been two strategies to protecting these monopoly returns. The first relies on patents; the second on developing innovations in secrecy and getting to the market first. How effective the second approach is depends upon how long one can expect to stave off competitive entry in a market one has pioneered. Have there been historical changes in how long the first mover's advantage can be effectively preserved? It took 33 years for imitators to enter the phonograph industry in the late nineteenth century, and only three years for rapid entry for an innovation in a successor industry, compact disc players. Is this a typical phenomenon? Is the decline in the duration of the interval prior to competitive entry consistent over time, or is the above simply an instance of anecdotal evidence?
We start by examining the advantages of first movers in terms of the entry barriers present for later entrants. Are there a priori reasons or empirical evidence for expecting historical changes in obstacles to entry?
Historical Changes in Factors Leading to Entry Barriers
As a starting point, let us use Bain's (1956) classification. He identified three main sources of entry barriers, those arising from: a) economies of scale and sunk costs, b) absolute cost advantages and c) product differentiation advantages. The initial analysis by Bain has been extended by others to include patent protection and other government restrictions to entry, the effects of advertising, control of scarce resources, and restrictions on the speed of information flow. In addition, recent researchers have also stressed the importance of technology lock-ins and path dependence as forces that increase market entrenchment of first movers. We consider historical changes in each of these factors in this section.
Economies to Scale and High Sunk Costs:
Bain considered economies of scale and high sunk costs to be two important sources of entry barriers. The role of high sunk costs was further developed by Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) in their theory of contestable markets. Further, high sunk costs act as entry barriers in industries characterized by capital intensive technologies. As argued by Stigler (1968) , however, for scale economies to serve as entry barriers, one needs to assume that the relevant market demand is insufficient to permit later entrants to attain minimum efficient scale given the presence of incumbent firms with sunk costs in the market. An alternative formulation of the same issue is that the problem arises not merely from the aggregate size of the market for a product but from the time it takes for a new entrant to gain a share of the market consistent with minimum efficient scale. This time interval may be prolonged by only the gradual consumer acceptance of the brands of new entrants.
Viewed in this way, there are reasons why barriers to entry arising from economies of scale and high sunk costs have eroded over time. Market demand has expanded more rapidly because of an increase in the potential market size, quicker dissemination of information across consumers and increases in consumer income. Golder and Tellis (1997) report on a historical decline in the time taken for diffusion of product information among consumers. In addition, over the last century, and after World War II in particular, there has been a reduction of effective geographical distance through improvements in transportation and an increasing globalization of markets. Firms enter foreign markets more easily. There has been considerable discussion in marketing literature on the positive relation of globalization of markets to increases in the diffusion rate of products across consumers, at home and abroad. Since returns to innovation and imitation are associated with market size, this raises the incentive to both innovate and imitate, thus decreasing the delay in competitive entry.
Advertising and Product Differentiation
Traditionally, following and expanding on Bain's original argument on product differentiation, advertising has been alleged to increase entry barriers by raising the absolute cost advantages of incumbent firms and by increasing capital requirements for entry. Schmalensee (1974, 1982) however, argued that the mere presence of advertising is not sufficient to lead to restrictions on entry. In the models developed by Schmalensee, uncertainty about product quality and differences in consumer experience with the competing brands lead to inequality in consumer acceptance between incumbent firms and later entrants, thereby leading to entry barriers. To the extent that advertising can be used by potential entrants to increase consumer information about quality and offer choices in price-quality combinations, advertising can in fact lead to a decline in the barriers to entry. Comanor and Wilson (1979) 
Absolute Cost Advantage
Bain attributed barriers to entry in the form of absolute cost advantages to management skills, to advantages in production techniques, to ownership of scarce inputs and to differences in capital costs. Differences in costs based on production techniques arise from patents, trade secrets or from learning by doing. Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) Finally, the effects of market globalization include entry by foreign firms. Our data show that not only has the presence of foreign firms in the product markets been steadily rising over the years, but that both the first movers and early competitors in products such as VCRs, CD players and Video Games have consisted predominantly of foreign firms. This broadens the resource base necessary for entry and renders it less likely that first movers can maintain exclusive control of the human capital and intellectual property rights needed for competitive entry.
Technology Lock-in and Path Dependence
Some authors in recent years have stressed the importance of path dependence in the evolution of technologies, e.g. Arthur (1989 Arthur ( , 1996 and Rutton (1997) . Path dependence implies that future success is to a large extent dependent on past achievements, which results in increasing returns from following a particular path. Path dependence may then lead to market entrenchment if a variant of a new technology, produced by an innovator, led to a cumulative advantage (increasing returns) over later entrants. This, it has been argued, could foreclose entry by producers of competing products even when the newer versions of a technology are superior due to technology lock-ins and high switching costs.
Have there been systematic changes in the period of first mover advantage over time? If so, how important are each of the above entry barriers, and their historical changes, in determining the lag before competitive entry ensues? This is the question we now examine.
Data
Accurate historical data on product life cycles are typically very difficult to obtain, hence the few empirical studies that are able to investigate systematically issues regarding new product markets. To test the hypothesis of a systematic decline in the years prior to competitive entry, we use data on 46 products (See Appendix It is particularly important to note here that the data were developed originally for a project that focused on entry, exit and survival of firms over the entire product life cycle. While choosing the products, we did not have any prior knowledge or expectation about the length of the initial monopoly interval for each product.
We began by identifying new product innovations by consulting various technical sources, scientific journals, chronologies and encyclopedias of new innovations. Process innovations, or organizational and social innovations (such as the assembly line, supermarkets, etc.) were excluded since our focus was on new markets. To be included in the sample, a product innovation had to be deemed significant by experts in the field, and result in entirely new product markets rather than improvements or sub-sections of existing markets. 4 As noted by Wind and Mahajan (1997) The annual volumes of the Thomas Register were then consulted to create a database identifying the firms manufacturing each product in every year after the inception of the product.
We cannot claim that the sample is necessarily representative of all product innovations.
Indeed, since the population of all product innovations has never been defined (let alone measured by anyone) there is no method available for drawing a representative sample. Our sample of innovations, however, does encompass a broad spectrum of important innovations in the past century. In fact, it undoubtedly represents a sizeable fraction of major product innovations, the absolute number of which is not large. And, as already noted, it was chosen for a study that investigated the survival of firms over the product life cycle, without reference to prior information on the duration of the interval before competitive entry. The sensitivity of the results to the choice of sample, in the context of an unknown population is best judged by the consistency over time of our results. In addition, Section 4 revisits the sample selection issue by presenting information on other products gathered from published studies that are tangentially related to the issue.
Results on Historical Change
As shown in Gort and Klepper (1982) , each new product market is associated with an interval of varying duration in which one firm, or at most a few firms, that were first in the commercial sale of the product occupy the entire market. This is followed by an interval (or stage) in which imitators enter the market and challenge the position of the first movers. The boundary between the successive stages is identified statistically by a generalization of standard discriminant analysis (The Appendix describes this methodology in detail). Once the boundary is defined, we compute the number of years that the first interval, preceding entry by imitators, encompasses. Table 1 gives the rate of decline in the duration over time. The results indicate that the duration has been shrinking at the rate of 2.93 percent a year. The R 2 of 0.53 and the strongly significant negative coefficient of time are sizable, but they probably understate the historical relation since there is no reason for assuming the relation in the duration of the first stage to time is continuous rather than episodic. Accordingly, we partitioned the period for which the data were developed into five periods of twenty years each and, second, into four periods where the latter explicitly maximize the differences in the duration of the first stage as a boundary defining criterion for the comparative analysis of changes over time intervals. Both approaches yield very similar results as shown in Table 2 .
The results, regardless of how one divides by period the entire century, show a very large and consistent (in successive periods) decline in the duration of the interval before entry by imitators. The average time-span for all products was almost 33 years at the turn of the century, and had declined to 3.4 years for innovations in 1967-86. Note, in particular, that the decline is largest in the post World War II period, the years during which there were dramatic advances . To test the significance of differences across time periods, we conduct both the Ftest, which relies on the assumption of normality for its validity, and the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test 6 in case the assumption of normality is inappropriate for our data. Both the F-statistic and the Kruskal-Wallis test show that the differences across the periods were highly significant.
A test of the extent to which our results depend on a fortuitous selection of our sample is indicated by the variance in the duration of the interval to competitive entry. If the results depend on idiosyncrasies of our sample and the impact of a few outliers in our data, we would expect a large erratic variation over time in the dispersion across products in the duration of the relevant interval. In fact, however, Table 3 shows that the standard deviation declined over time roughly proportionately to the decline in the means. The coefficients of variation show 6 The Kruskal-Wallis test rank-orders the observations and computes the following test statistic:
where n is the number of observations, k is the number of periods, R i is the rank of the i th observation, and n i is the number of observation in the k th group. If the sample includes tied observations, a correction factor is applied to the above statistic, which is modified as H* = H / C where ) 1 ( -1 remarkable stability whether the whole period is divided into two or four periods of equal length. 
Evidence on Other Products from Related Studies
Corroboration for the trends we observe in our data can be found in other published studies on product innovations and their diffusion over time, though the investigation of the initial monopoly interval in product innovations was not the central focus of these studies. Since the data requirements for tracking product life cycles and related issues are quite substantial, most of the papers reviewed here present anecdotal evidence for at most a few products. The cumulative evidence of all these papers, though, seems consistent with our finding of a generally declining trend in the monopoly interval of product life cycles. Utterback (1994) investigates several new product innovations in the context of the dominant design framework and there is substantial overlap in his product categories and those reported here. For the products not included in our sample, he reports that entry in early product markets (typewriters, automobiles and electric lights) was "relatively slow," while competitors entered rapidly in products introduced later (transistors, disk drives, integrated chips and electronic calculators). Long monopoly spans are also observed by Chandler (1990) for products introduced around the turn of the century (sewing machines, elevators, telephones, and cameras).
Conversely, case studies of more recent products show very short monopoly spans. For example, Bayus, Jain and Rao (1997) investigate the personal digital assistant product market, and report rapid entry of competitors within two years of its introduction. Bayus (1998) examines several product categories within the personal computer industry, and his data are consistent with very short monopoly intervals. Finally, Golder and Tellis (1993) study fifty new product markets (of which nine overlap with the products in our study) in the context of market leadership and market pioneers, and remark that the lag between pioneers and early entrants has declined dramatically from the pre to post World War II time period. They report an average time lag of 19 years in the products introduced in the pre-World War II period, and a lag of only five years in the products introduced post World War II. While their methodology and definitions are not strictly comparable to ours, their results, using largely an entirely different product sample, are remarkably consistent with those seen in Table 2 .
The above studies cumulatively encompass more than 50 products not covered in our study and support our conclusion of a declining trend in the monopoly interval of the product life cycle. Thus, this decline is unlikely to be an accident of the products selected for our sample.
The Variables that Determine Change
We now turn to evidence that bears on the question of what changes in entry barriers produced the reported results. In Section 1, we indicated that received literature focused mainly on (a) economies of scale and sunk costs (b) advertising and product differentiation and (c) absolute cost advantages. While direct measures of each of these are not available for most of the markets we examined in this paper, plausible conclusions can be drawn from the use of proxy variables.
We therefore turn to Before examining the relevance of each set of classifications from the stand-point of entry barriers, we report that the declines in the mean duration are systematic for each of the three sets of categories, and the mean durations across each set of two are roughly the same.
Once again, this shows that the pronounced decline is not likely to be a function of sample selection. However one partitions the products, the results are much the same. This reinforces the conclusions already drawn on the basis of Table 3 .
Turning to entry barriers identified above, let us first consider the distinction between consumer and non-consumer goods. Product differentiation and advertising are likely to be far less important as determinants of sales of producer goods or goods purchased by the government than for the sales of consumer goods. The absence of difference in the decline over time in the duration of the interval prior to competitive entry for the two categories has, therefore, an important implication. It indicates that it is most unlikely that changes in product differentiation and advertising explain the observed results.
Second, consider the role of sunk costs. The higher the capital intensiveness, the greater should the role of sunk costs be as an entry barrier. Yet once again we find no significant difference in the pattern of decline over time in the period before competitive entry for products of high and of low capital intensiveness. We can thus largely eliminate the hypothesis that changes in the role of sunk costs are an explanation of the decline in the interval before competitive entry.
What about economies of scale, or more precisely, as discussed in Section 1, the ratio of minimum efficient scale for new entrants and market size or, even more important, market growth? We have no hard evidence on changes in minimum efficient scale but we do have evidence on market size and growth. The growth in population, the globalization of markets as well as growth in their geographic scope within countries all mean larger size and faster initial growth from a zero starting point. Hence the importance of minimum efficient scale as an entry barrier is reduced. Even if minimum efficient scale grew, higher market growth was at least a facilitating factor for entry.
Still another variable that needs to be considered is absolute cost advantage. Indeed, we consider this central to an explanation of the contraction of the interval before competitive entry.
We have argued that there is evidence of a rise in the mobility of the labor force and in particular, of managerial and technical personnel, that facilitates the transfer of information and skills needed for entry. This transfer is further strengthened by the growth in number and importance of scientific and trade journals. As the rate of diffusion of information rises, the role of knowledge as an absolute cost advantage and, hence, entry barrier diminishes. A somewhat surprising result was the fact that the decline in mean duration before competitive entry was very similar for goods characterized as technical rather than non-technical, as seen in Table 4 .
Apparently, the rate of transfer of knowledge and skills is a critical variable for both categories of products.
A contrary effect raising absolute cost advantage for the first mover is, however, sometimes attributed to the increasing complexity of technology. It follows that the more technologically intensive the product, the more critical are the unique technological attributes of the product and the greater the probability of path dependence. Thus, technology lock-ins leading to market entrenchment should cause an increase in the quasi-monopoly interval, particularly for goods where technology plays an important role. In contrast, our results point to acceleration of the erosion of market position by an innovator for all products in the sample, and at a rate at least as high, if not higher, for technical goods. Thus, the results seem to support the view that forces of rapid information dissemination and reverse engineering have been gaining in importance over the adverse effects on entry of early technology lock-ins by first movers.
Some Further Implications
Do our results mean that incentives for investment in innovation have also been declining? Not necessarily. As markets in the economy grow, the rewards per unit of time for a monopoly position grow commensurately. Four years of quasi-monopoly today may generate a larger aggregate return than thirty years at the turn of the century. And while the market shares of first movers may decline because of the speed of competitive entry, the absolute size of sales may be increasing. There is also considerable evidence that pioneers and first-movers frequently retain the reward of a large market share long after they cease to have a monopoly position in the market. Buyer switching costs and network externalities, on the demand side, and learning by doing, scale economies and set-up and sunk costs, on the supply side, contribute to retention of market shares (See Katz and Shapiro (1986) , Mueller (1997) and Robinson, Kalyanaram and Urban (1994) ).
Nevertheless, the principal result of our study is that the magnitude of the first mover advantage, which captures all the factors contributing to or attenuating entrenchment, appears to have been systematically declining over the last century in the United States. This bodes well for the future of competition.
It may also mean that in the future, more emphasis will be placed by innovators on patent protection as compared to trade secrets and getting to the market as quickly as possible. In a recent paper, Kortum and Lerner (1997) report a remarkable increase in the rate of patenting in the United States since the mid-1980s. Could this partly be a lagged response to evolutionary changes in the rate of competitive entry in new industries? Rational entrepreneurs may well have realized that one reason for the decline in the quasi-monopoly interval is the speed at which imitators gain access to the innovation related information, and thus rely on patents rather than trade secrets to protect their intellectual property rights.
Conclusions
We have examined the forces that contribute to and attenuate entry barriers. While there are theoretical reasons for concluding both that entry barriers in new markets have been rising and falling, the empirical evidence leads to a far less equivocal conclusion. The rate of initial competitive entry in new markets has been rising rapidly and steadily over the last century, pointing to a weakening of entry barriers on net balance. We attribute this outcome largely to a) increased mobility of skilled labor, b) improvements in communication and as a consequence more rapid diffusion of technical information, c) an increase in the population of potential entrants and d) growth in the absolute size of markets.
The results do not necessarily imply a reduction in the incentive to innovate, but are consistent with a possible effect of the observed trends-that firms may increase their reliance on patenting rather than trade secrets. Hadlock, Hecker and Gannon (1991) , who use the ratio of R&D employees to total personnel to distinguish between technical and non-technical industries at the 3-digit SIC levels. Capital intensive and labor intensive goods are classified on the basis of the capital-labor ratio of the 4-digit SIC industries, and the ratios are derived from the Census of Manufactures for 1972 and 1987, the years in which most of the products were at the mid-point of their life cycle. Products in the study were classified as having a high capital labor ratio if they were in the upper half of the industries based on this ratio.
Appendix

Procedure to Identify Stage Prior to Competitive Entry
The procedure that we used to identify the interval prior to competitive entry is the same as the generalization of the standard discriminant analysis used in Gort and Klepper (1982) to separate the stages in the product life cycle. To distinguish between Stage I (monopoly returns interval)
and Stage II (start of competitive entry), we examined the data on annual net entry rates for each product. To determine the cut-off year for stage I, we first partitioned the series into three categories-the first and third category contained the years where the net entry rate clearly reflected stages I and II respectively. The net entry rates of the T consecutive "in-between" years of the second category were then labeled x 1 , x 2 ,…,x T . The problem was then to choose an optimal dividing year j such that observations x 1 , x 2 ,…,x j are classified in stage I, and x j+1 , x j+2 ,…,x T are classified in stage II. This was accomplished using a three step procedure: Step 2 requires that the mean of the observations classified in each of the two stages is closer to the sample mean of the observations initially classified in those stages than in the alternative stage.
Step 3 ensures that, among the classifications that would satisfy 2, the classification that is chosen maximizes the difference between the means of the points classified in the two alternative stages.
